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Handling a User’s Preferences on Permissions Required by an Application Software

Abstract:
This publication describes an operating system (OS) that uses a privacy layer for handling
a user’s preferences on permissions required by an application software (application). The privacy
layer injects mock data into application programming interface (API) calls when the application
requests a permission-protected resource. As described herein, a permission-protected resource
may include user data (e.g., calendar, contacts data, notes, user-biometric data) and access to user
equipment (UE) hardware (e.g., gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) technology, proximity sensors, touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors,
heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity sensors, radar technology, cameras, microphones) that
the user does not want to grant access to the application. The OS gives the user the choice to
enable the privacy layer for each application or enable the privacy layer across the OS. This
privacy layer protects the user’s privacy and allows the user to utilize the application without
sharing information that the user wants to keep private.
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Background:
Operating system (OS) developers, application software (application) developers,
application software markets (application markets), and user equipment (UE) manufacturers
increasingly offer users more product features. A widely-used UE, such as a smartphone, enables
the user to call, participate in a video-conferencing session, text, email, bank, invest, shop, search
for information, consume several types of media, participate in social networking, play games,
navigate to a location, and use a plethora of other applications. In addition, UE manufacturers
often integrate accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global navigation satellite
system (GNSS) technology (e.g., global positioning satellite (GPS)), proximity sensors,
touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors, heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity sensors, radar
technology, cameras, microphones, and various other sensors in or on the UE, which enhance the
user experience and may play a role on the functionality of various applications. Furthermore, the
OS, the application market, the UE, and applications help manage user data, such as contacts data,
short message service (SMS) data, notes, calendar data, user biometric data (e.g., fingerprint data,
voice recognition data), credit card numbers, and other user specific data, which may also play a
role on the functionality of various applications.
When the user installs an application, the application may request permissions to access
user data (e.g., calendar) and certain UE hardware (e.g., microphones, cameras, GNSS,
accelerometers). Figure 1 illustrates how the OS may prompt the user to accept or deny permission
requests by an application when the user installs an application downloaded from the application
market.
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Figure 1
Assume Jane downloads a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) application software called
VoIP Service X. Jane’s friends are increasingly using VoIP Service X, and Jane wants to start using
it to stay in touch with her friends. Also, assume Jane is aware that VoIP Service X allows users
to make calls, send messages, track each-other’s location, and communicate using videoconferencing sessions. As Jane downloads VoIP Service X, the OS and the application market let
her know that this application requests permission to access her contacts data, her location, the
UE’s speaker, the UE’s microphone, and the UE’s camera, as illustrated in Figure 1. Jane
understands that VoIP Service X requests permissions to access her contacts data, the speaker, the
microphone, and the camera, and her location, because VoIP Service X supports features that
require access to the requested permissions. Jane may be thinking, “I wish I can use VoIP Service
X without granting access to my exact GNSS-tracked location because all I want to do is call, send
messages, and participate in video-conferencing sessions.”
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The example VoIP Service X application, however, requires Jane to grant access to the user
data and the UE features illustrated in Figure 1 before Jane can start using the application because
part of the appeal of VoIP Service X, is for friends to keep track of each other when they are
attending a busy event, such as downtown on a Friday night, in a concert, Oktoberfest, and so forth.
Jane, like many other users, decides to avoid using VoIP Service X due to the required permissions
upon installation or usage. Jane, however, can see the value that VoIP Service X can provide to
her social life. Therefore, it is desirable to have a technological solution that enables users to
install and use applications while protecting their privacy.

Description:
This publication describes an operating system (OS) that uses a privacy layer for handling
a user’s preferences on permissions required by an application software (application). The privacy
layer injects mock data (e.g., simulated, modified, truncated, pre-recorded, fake, noise) into the
system application programming interface (API) calls when the application requests a permissionprotected resource. As described herein, a permission-protected resource may be user data (e.g.,
calendar, contacts data, notes, user-biometric data) and user equipment (UE) hardware (e.g.,
gyroscopes, magnetometers, barometers, global-positioning system (GPS) technology, proximity
sensors, touchscreen sensors, biometric sensors, heart-rate sensors, thermometers, humidity
sensors, radar technology, cameras, microphones) that the user does not want to grant access to
the application.
The OS gives the user the choice to enable the privacy layer for each application under an
easily-accessible user setting. The user controls which permission-protected resource they want
the privacy layer to protect. The OS may inform the application when the user chooses to protect
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access to certain user data and hardware. At this stage, the user, the OS, and the application are
aware that certain data may be mock data in order for the user to utilize application features and
protect the user’s privacy. If, however, an application developer refuses to allow the user to use
the application when the privacy layer is enabled for reasons that are not clear to the OS or the
user, the OS may make the use of the privacy layer opaque (instead of transparent) to the
application.
The OS supplies mock data on a case-by-case basis. For example, a navigation application
requires exact GNSS-tracked location in order for the user to safely use the application. As another
example, a racing game application requires real accelerometer-produced and gyroscope-produced
data for the user to play the game. In such cases, the OS does not give the user the choice to enable
the privacy layer on access to user data and hardware that are required to use the application as
intended. The OS provides true data to the application when the real data is essential to use the
application or the user has decided to grant the requested permissions.
Recalling Jane’s example in Figure 1, the example VoIP Service X application requires
Jane to grant permissions to access her contacts data, her location, the UE’s speaker, the UE’s
microphone, and the UE’s camera. The OS prompts Jane to select which permission-protected
resource she wants the privacy layer to protect. If Jane wants to protect her location, the privacy
layer provides real data to the VoIP Service X application from the UE’s speaker, the UE’s
microphone, and UE’s camera and provides mock data, such as Jane’s city or a fixed location in a
larger vicinity (instead of her GNSS-tracked location). If Jane wants to use VoIP Service X to only
make and receive calls, the OS provides real data to only her contacts data, the UE’s speaker, and
the UE’s microphone and provides mock data for her camera and her location.
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In addition to the user’s choice to enable the privacy layer for each application, the user
may choose to enable the privacy layer across the OS. In that case, the OS uses the privacy layer
depending on the features of each application. To show how the privacy layer may work when
enabled across the OS, consider the example illustrated in Figure 2.

2A) Social Media X

2B) Navigation Application Y
Figure 2

Assume Tom and Ben are on a road trip, and Tom is using his smartphone during the road
trip. Tom has enabled the privacy layer across the OS of the smartphone. Tom and Ben have
decided to leave their hometown, Geneva, Switzerland, to spend one night in Turin, Italy and a
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few days in Milan, Italy. As Tom and Ben get close to the border of France and Italy, they stop
their car when they see Mont Blanc — the highest and the most famous mountain of the Alps.
Tom decides to take a photo and posts it in the Social Media X application, as illustrated in Figure
2A. The example Social Media X application requires users to grant permission to access their
location before they can use the application. The privacy layer, however, supplies a fake location
in accordance with the user’s wishes because location is not an essential part of the Social Media
X application’s functionality. Differently said, the Social Media X application does not know
Tom’s and Ben’s location unless Tom explicitly decides to share his GNSS-tracked location.
As Tom and Ben drive from Geneva, through France, to Turin, they use a navigation
application called Navigation Application Y, as illustrated in Figure 2B. Given that the GNSStracked location is essential to the Navigation Application Y functionality, the OS supplies real
GNSS-tracked location to the Navigation Application Y application. Therefore, the Navigation
Application Y application knows Tom’s location, but the Social Media X application does not know
Tom’s location even though both applications require Tom to grant access to his location.
In conclusion, the privacy layer for handling a user’s preferences on permissions to access
user data and hardware required by an application protects the user’s privacy and allows the user
to utilize the application without sharing information that the user wants to keep private.
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